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In this paper we first document inequality trends in wages, hours worked, earnings, consumption, and
wealth for Germany from the last twenty years. We generally find that inequality was relatively stable
in West Germany until the German unification (which happened politically in 1990 and in our data
in 1991), and then trended upwards for wages and market incomes, especially after about 1998. Disposable
income and consumption, on the other hand, display only a modest increase in inequality over the
same period. These trends occured against the backdrop of lower trend growth of earnings, incomes
and consumption in the 1990s relative to the 1980s. In the second part of the paper we further analyze
the differences between East and West Germans in terms of the evolution of levels and inequality

















MEA, University of Mannheim
L 13, 17
68131 Mannueim, Germany
mathias.sommer@gmx.netKeywords: Inequality, German Uni￿cation
JEL Classi￿cation: D31, D33, E24
1 Introduction
In this paper we document inequality trends in wages, hours worked, earn-
ings, consumption, and wealth for Germany from the last two decades, us-
ing household-level data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
study and the Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS). The objective of this
paper is two-fold. First, our work is part of a larger research project that at-
tempts to document Cross-Sectional Facts for Macroeconomists for a variety
of countries in a uniform way (see Krueger, Perri, Pistaferri and Violante,
2008), and many of the choices concerning data, sample selection and the
choice of what facts to present are motivated by common guidelines across
countries. But second, since the German case is special because of the unique
event of the German Reuni￿cation in 1990 (1991 in most of our data) we
analyze in greater detail the impact on overall wage, income, consumption
and wealth inequality by East Germany (o¢ cially, the German Democratic
Republic, GDR) joining West Germany (o¢ cially, the Federal Republic of
Germany, FRG) roughly in the middle of our sample period.
Summarizing our main results, we ￿nd that, roughly speaking, inequality
remained constant in West Germany until the German uni￿cation in 1990
(and might even have slightly declined), and then trended upwards. We
also note, however, that income measures that include public redistribution
through taxes and transfers display signi￿cantly lower increases in inequality
(if any) than pre-tax/transfer income measures. Consumption inequality
mirrors this trend in disposable income inequality (or the lack thereof). These
inequality trends have to be interpreted against the backdrop of signi￿cantly
lower trend growth of earnings and incomes in the 1990s relative to the 1980s.
Our analysis of economic inequality and its trends in Germany is related
to a growing number of studies that use household micro data from the
GSOEP or the EVS to document how the cross-sectional distribution of wages
or income has evolved in the last 25 years. For wages, Dustmann et al. (2007)
use o¢ cial social security records to document trends in wage dispersion in
the 1980s and 1990s. They ￿nd that in the 1980s wage dispersion rose only
at the top of the distribution, while in the 1990s it also rose at the bottom
of the distribution. While our GSOEP data likely misses some of the wage
2observations at the very top and thus it is not surprising that we do not
observe the increase in wage inequality prior to German uni￿cation, our
analysis exhibits the same increase in wage inequality in the 1990s that they
￿nd.
Bach et al. (2007) integrate GSOEP and tax data to document trends in
inequality in market incomes for 1992 to 2001. They ￿nd that inequality, as
measured by the Gini, increases moderately. Behind this trend in the Gini
is hidden a substantial decline in median income and a strong increase in
income at the top 0.1% of the distribution. Furthermore, households at the
top of the distribution obtain an increasing share of their income through
labor income (although capital income still dominates as a source of overall
income). While our focus on GSOEP (and EVS) data does not permit us to
obtain a precise picture of the very top of the income distribution, the trends
in pre-tax income inequality we document are consistent with their ￿ndings.
Biewen (2000) ￿nds that inequality in equivalized (by household size)
disposable income has remained stable for West German households between
1984 and 1996, and a strong increase in inequality among East German
households between 1990 and 1996. In section 7 of our paper we decompose
inequality trends in Germany into its regional (East and West) components
and obtain very similar results for disposable income and other economic
variables of interest.1
For wealth, Hauser and Stein (2003) use the EVS from 1973 to 1998 to
document inequality levels and trends in West German household wealth,
composed of real estate, consumer durables and ￿nancial assets at market
values. They document somewhat of a decline in wealth inequality (as mea-
sured by the Gini coe¢ cient) between 1973 and 1988, and a further decline
between 1988 and 1993. Wealth inequality in 1998 is marginally higher than
in 1993. Our most comprehensive measure of wealth, which also includes ￿-
nancial wealth and real estate (but not other consumer durables) in contrast
displays somewhat of an increase in inequality, also measured by the Gini, for
the years 1978 to 1988. For the period between 1993 and 1998 we measure
the overall wealth Gini as essentially unchanged, as they do. However, we
do not ￿nd a decline in wealth inequality that they display for their wealth
1Frick and Grabka (2008) as well as Becker et al. (2003) analyze the evolution of Gini
coe¢ cients of disposable income in Germany. Frick and Grabka (2008) report a somewhat
larger increase in the Gini since 1998 than we ￿nd, a discrepancy that can be explained
by the di⁄erences in sample de￿nitions and equivalization schemes employed in this paper
relative to theirs. In fact, if we use their de￿nitions we obtain very similar results to theirs.
3measure between 1978 and 1988.2
Finally, Schwarze (1996) decomposes the change in income inequality
directly after the German reuni￿cation into the parts attributable to changes
in inequality in the East, inequality in the West, and changes in inequality
between both regions. In the second part of the paper we employ a similar
decomposition analysis (although we use a di⁄erent, linearly decomposable
inequality statistic, the variance of logs, which is also our primary statistic
used in other parts of the paper) for a wider range of economic variables
and a longer time horizon to document di⁄erential trends of inequality in the
former Eastern and the former Western parts of the country.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we brie￿ y describe
the historical context and the macroeconomic environment during our sam-
ple period. We also provide a brief overview over the two key data sources
underlying the facts presented here. In section 3 we then discuss trends in
the levels of average wages, income, and consumption from our micro data,
and compare these trends to the corresponding ￿gures from the German Na-
tional Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). Section 4 is devoted to our
main object of interest, namely the evolution of inequality in Germany over
the last two decades. In section 5 we display how inequality of wages, earn-
ings, and consumption in Germany evolve over the life cycle. We make use
of the GSOEP panel dimension to estimate, in section 6, a parsimonious
stochastic wage and earnings process for Germany that can be used as an
important input in structural macroeconomic models with household het-
erogeneity. Finally, in section 7 we pay tribute to the unique event of the
German Reuni￿cation and carry out a more detailed analysis of how the
inequality trends displayed in section 4 have been a⁄ected (in a statistical
sense) by this event. Section 8 concludes.
2Furthermore, the increase in wealth inequality we document throughout the sample
period is signi￿cantly larger when we restrict attention to ￿nancial wealth only. The
di⁄erences in ￿ndings are mainly attributed to the fact that our wealth measure di⁄ers
from theirs and that they do not employ as restrictive a sample selection criterion as we
do (both our choices were made in order to conform to the general data guidelines for the
overall project).
42 Historical Background and Data Situation
2.1 Macroeconomic and Institutional Conditions Dur-
ing the Sample Period
Within the period for which we have data to document inequality in Ger-
many falls the single most important political and economic event of post
WWII Germany, the German uni￿cation. The decade 1980-90 prior to uni-
￿cation was characterized by what Giersch, Paque and Schmieding in 1992
called the Fading Miracle. These authors document that relative to the post
WWII period growth in Germany had slowed down. From the perspective
of 15 years later, however, the years prior to German uni￿cation look good
(judging by the metric of economic growth) relative to what was about to
follow. As we document below, income and consumption per capita grew at
healthy rates in the 1980s and economic inequality was at least not rising
(and quite possibly falling), whereas in post-uni￿cation Germany per capita
income and consumption grew at lower rates and became less equally dis-
tributed (depending on the economic variable considered, substantially so).
In terms of the institutional and political background, as a ￿rst approxi-
mation, the decade prior to uni￿cation in West Germany was characterized
by fairly constant economic policy; no major reforms in the tax and social
insurance systems occurred. Again, broadly speaking the period following
the German uni￿cation is characterized by policy reforms attempting to deal
with the consequences of this massive and quite unexpected political and
macroeconomic shock.3 These reforms, as well as the adoption of West Ger-
man institutions in East Germany (such as the West German PAYGO social
security system and the unemployment insurance system), resulted in mas-
sive income transfers from the West to the East. For example, in 1991 they
amounted to 113 billion DM, or 7000 DM per capita, about 1/3 of disposable
income per capita in the East and more than double the total disposable in-
come per capita in Poland at the time (see Sinn and Sinn (1992), table
II.2). While these transfers were to a large extent ￿nanced by an increase
in government debt, tax increases (mainly the so-called Solidarit￿tszuschlag,
a 7.5% surcharge applied to the general income tax burden4) signi￿cantly
3For a comprehensive account of the economic aspects of the German uni￿cation, see
Sinn and Sinn (1992).
4The surcharge applies to the personal income tax, capital income tax and corporate
income tax, not to income itself. East and West German households both have to pay the
5contributed to the ￿nancing of these transfers, and may have had an impact
on inequality between the East and the West, and within the former Western
part of the country.5
2.2 The Data6
We will make use of two large household level data sources for Germany that
contain partial information on wages, hours worked, income, consumption,
and wealth: the EVS (Income and Expenditure Survey, Einkommens- und
Verbrauchsstichprobe in German) and the GSOEP (German Socioeconomic
Panel).7 We now describe the EVS and the GSOEP in greater detail.8
2.2.1 The German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)
The GSOEP is an annual household panel, comparable in scope to the Amer-
ican PSID.9 It was ￿rst conducted in 1984 in West Germany with about in
4500 households.10 In the spring of 1990, i.e. after the fall of the Berlin Wall
but before o¢ cial German reuni￿cation, 2170 households from East Germany
surcharge. The rate was lowered to 5.5% in 1998.
5In 2003 the so-called agenda 2010 was announced, a substantial reform of the German
social insurance system. While most of the measures introduced under this reform did not
become e⁄ective until after our data sample ends, it is conceivable that early e⁄ects of the
agenda are visible in the data as early as 2004 (for the GSOEP data).
6For a general description and motivation of sample selection criteria and vari-
able de￿nitions we refer the reader to the data guidelines for the overall cross-country
project. For a more detailed description of the German data used and our implementa-
tions of the basic guidelines with German data, see the separate appendix, available at
http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~dkrueger/research/Gerapp.pdf.
7A third micro data set for Germany is the Microcensus. Since this data set only
contains information on labor force participation, we will not directly use it in this study.
8Note that while both surveys are meant to be representative of the German population,
di⁄erences in survey methods and variable de￿nitions could lead to di⁄erent levels and
trends in inequality across the two surveys even for variables that are available in both
surveys, such as various household income measures. Becker et al. (2003) provide a
detailed account of the survey di⁄erences and their impact on measured income inequality
levels and trends.
9We use the 95 percent random sample available to researchers outside of Germany.
10GSOEP variables in the survey year on hours and income measures refer to the previ-
ous year. So while 1984 was the ￿rst year in which the survey was conducted, 1983 is the
￿rst year for which these variables are measured. An exception is disposable household
income, since household asset income was measured for the ￿rst time for the year 1984.
6were included (this implies that East Germans are oversampled). In 1998 and
again in 2000 refreshment samples increased the sample sizes substantially.
The data from the GSOEP that we use is drawn from the 1984 to 2005 waves
and thus extends from 1983 (1984 for selected variables) to 2004.
We use the GSOEP to construct inequality measures of wages, earnings,
hours worked, and income. Since the GSOEP is a full panel, it also lends
itself naturally to the estimation of the stochastic process for wages and
earnings that we carry out below. On the other hand, the GSOEP contains
no useful comprehensive information on consumption and wealth.11 Thus for
these variables we turn to the EVS, which we describe next.
2.2.2 The Income and Expenditure Survey (EVS)
The EVS is a repeated cross section data set that is carried out every 5 years,
starting from 1962/63. Because of data privacy reasons only the data from
1978 onwards are available for scienti￿c research. Thus there is a total of 6
cross-sections available from the EVS for our study. The scope of the EVS
is similar to the American CEX, with its main focus on detailed household
consumption and wealth data. The sample size is large: about 0.2% of the
population or about 60,000 households in the most recent survey. Relative
to the GSOEP, only current residence is reported, making it impossible to
deduce whether household members grew up in West or East Germany. The
variables of interest for the current study that are available in the EVS are
primarily consumption and wealth. In addition, the EVS also contains a
large variety of information on earnings and income.12
3 Trends in Wage, Income and Consumption
Levels
In this section we document how the trends in wage, income and consumption
levels documented from NIPA compare to the evolution of the ￿rst moments
11A wealth questionnaire has been added to the GSOEP in 2002. In addition to the late
addition of this module, the wealth data in the GSOEP are signi￿cantly bottom-coded,
making this data set less than ideal for the purpose of our study with respect to the wealth
variable. Therefore we document wealth inequality using the EVS.
12For only selected years, some information is also available on labor force participation
and hours worked.
7of the corresponding income and consumption distributions from our house-
hold level data. This comparison is meant to provide a ￿rst quality check of
the household level data that we use. We also display trends in labor force
participation rates and average hours worked from both the micro data and
aggregate statistics.
3.1 Disposable Income
In ￿gure 1 we plot the evolution of annual per capita disposable income
from aggregate NIPA data and from the household surveys (both EVS and
GSOEP). In order to make this comparison as meaningful as possible we
choose, both from NIPA as well as from the household data, as our income
measure nominal disposable income of private households divided by the
population size13 and the consumer price index (so that all numbers are
in constant 2000 Euros). To clearly visualize the change in the sample from
1990 to 1991 due to the inclusion of East German households in the ￿gure (as
in all ￿gures to follow) the vertical line indicates the exact point of sample
change. Furthermore note that the disposable income observations in the
GSOEP start only in 1984 while the EVS observations start in 1978. Thus
to insure maximum comparability we start the plot in 1983 (with the second
EVS observation).
The trends in income levels from the household surveys line up well with
the facts from NIPA.14 There was healthy income growth in West Germany
through the 1980￿ s (at roughly 2.5% per year from 1983 to 1990, and con-
sistent between NIPA and GSOEP), followed by a drop through the compo-
sition e⁄ect at the time of reuni￿cation15. Both the healthy growth in per
capita income as well as the decline between 1990 and 1991 is of very similar
13In the case of GSOEP and EVS, this is measured as the number of individuals (not
households), in the sample. In contrast to the inequality statistics where we impose more
stringent sample selection criteria, all households for which information is available for
the variable under consideration are included in the calculation of the means from the
household-level data.
14The levels are lower in GSOEP, which can at least partly be explained by the fact
that the very rich are not represented well in GSOEP.
15In both household data sets as well as in the NIPA data East German households ￿rst
enter in 1991. Since the EVS records data only every ￿ve years (that is, 1988 is the last
year with the exclusively West German sample, and 1993 is the ￿rst year with the uni￿ed
German sample), the per capita income drop due to German reuni￿cation is not visible in
this data set.

























































Figure 1: Per Capita Disposable Income, NIPA, GSOEP and EVS
magnitude in the aggregate data and the household data from the GSOEP.
Following the uni￿cation the compounded growth rate of real per capita
disposable income from 1991 to 2004 is 9.6% in the GSOEP household data
set (0.7% per annum) and 7.7% (0.6% per annum) in the NIPA data, while
the EVS records a growth rate of 4.1% (0.4% per annum) between 1993
and 2003. Therefore all data sets display slow growth in income per capita
in post-uni￿cation Germany (with only the period between 1996 and 2000
displaying signi￿cant growth at all). Overall, the trends in real disposable
income levels per capita are remarkably similar for the GSOEP on which we
will base our inequality trends analysis for wages, hours worked, earnings,
and income and the NIPA, and at least plausibly similar for the EVS and
NIPA (we do not use EVS data for our income inequality analysis).16
16Becker et al. (2003) also document that mean income levels are higher in the EVS
than in the GSOEP and attribute the di⁄erences (which are of roughly similar magnitude
than the ones documented here) to the methodological di⁄erences between the two surveys
(mainly the book-keeping approach used in the EVS versus retrospective questions in the
93.2 Wages
Figure 2 displays average real wages from aggregate labor statistics and from
the GSOEP. The aggregate statistics measure gross wages and salaries per
hour worked, and therefore do not subtract taxes and other social insurance
contributions.17 The average wage measure from the GSOEP micro data is
also a gross wage, and is derived by dividing annual wages or salaries by
annual hours worked. This implies that if annual hours are measured with
error, so will be hourly wages from the GSOEP.18 Both the aggregate and the
micro wage data are de￿ ated by the German CPI and expressed in constant
2000 Euros.
The ￿gure displays several interesting facts. As for disposable income,
average wages from NIPA show a healthy growth of 2.3% per year from 1983
to 1990, a drop in 1991 (because East German wages were initially substan-
tially lower than West German wages), and slower wage growth after 1991.
The average growth rate of real wages as measured by aggregate statistics
between 1991 and 2004 is a meager 0.9%, again consistent with the growth
rate of disposable income in aggregate data documented above. The micro
data paint a similar picture in the post-uni￿cation period, with average wage
growth rates of 0.8% per year (0.6% for males and 1.2% for females). On
the other hand, the micro data do not display the very strong growth in
real wages in the pre-uni￿cation period that the aggregate data show. While
wages for the entire sample do grow by about 1.2% p.a. in the years prior
to uni￿cation (1.1% for males and 1.6% for females) the micro data does not
fully match the strong growth of wages (2.3% at an annual level) observed
at the aggregate level for wages. As we will discuss further below, this diver-
gence is likely due to di⁄erences in the aggregate and micro trends in hours
worked (in conjunction with the way wages are derived from the GSOEP, by
dividing annual earnings by measured hours worked).
GSOEP, as well as the fact that taxes paid are imputed, and thus likely overstated, in the
GSOEP and directly surveyed in the EVS).
17Source for NIPA wages: Institut f￿r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB).
18The GSOEP tends to overstate hours worked, especially because it does not account
well for vacation days and sick leave. This leads to an underestimation of wages. If the
overstatement of hours has become more severe over time for some reason, then growth
of average wages in GSOEP will be biased downwards. While average vacation days have
increased over our sample period, sick leave days have rather decreased.


















































Figure 2: Average Wages, NIPA and GSOEP
3.3 Consumption
We now turn to consumption. In ￿gure 3 we plot per capita real consumption
against time for two measures of consumption: nondurable consumption and
nondurable consumption plus (imputed) rent payments by households.19 For
German micro data, the only available data source is the EVS, which is
conducted only every ￿ve years; therefore the plots for micro data contain
only six observations, and higher frequency ￿ uctuations in real per capita
19For the NIPA data we summed up nominal consumption expenditures for food and to-
bacco, transportation, entertainment, outside dining and hotel services and miscellaneous
expenditures and de￿ ated nominal expenditure by the CPI, in order to be as comparable as
possible to the EVS micro data. The resulting variable is used as nondurable consumption.
We add expenditures for housing, water, gas and electricity to obtain the nondurables-plus
consumption measure.
The EVS nondurable consumption measure includes food, clothes, energy, health, body-
care, travel, communication, education, and household services. We add (imputed) rent
to obtain the nondurable-plus consumption measure.
11consumption cannot be compared to NIPA data.


































































Figure 3: Consumption per Capita, NIPA and EVS
First, both aggregate and household data display similar trends after re-
uni￿cation and line up well even in levels. In fact, from 1993 to 2003, per
capita real nondurable consumption growth averaged about 1% annually in
both the NIPA and the EVS. Nondurables plus (imputed) rents increased at
a somewhat fast rate of 1.25%, again fairly uniformly across the two data
sets. Also the EVS data for 1988 line up well with NIPA. The main devia-
tion between micro and macro consumption data occurs between 1978 and
1988 where NIPA nondurables grow at an annualized rate of 2% (2.2% for
nondurables+) and the EVS micro data display an annualized growth rate
of 0.6% for nondurables and 1.1% for nondurables+. Interestingly EVS not
only understates consumption growth, but also income growth over this time
period, relative to NIPA (see ￿gure 1). Thus, while it is certainly conceivable
that the small di⁄erences in the de￿nition of the consumption aggregates be-
tween NIPA and EVS are partially to blame for this divergence, the facts
12that the latter sample period does not display the same problem, that the
divergence also occurs for income and that the components that make up
nondurable consumption are rather well aligned between NIPA and EVS
lead us to conclude that other reasons must mainly be responsible for the
di⁄erence in consumption growth over the 1978 to 1988 period.20 While this
di⁄erence is not as massive as e.g. the divergence displayed in a comparison
between U.S. CEX household and aggregate consumption data, it is a point
of concern that we have not seen documented elsewhere and that deserves
further empirical investigation.
3.4 Participation Rates and Average Hours Worked
In order to get a sense whether the GSOEP data capture basic trends in
labor market activity of individuals we now contrast participation rates and
average hours worked from aggregate statistics and from the GSOEP. In
￿gure 4 we plot the aggregate employment rate (de￿ned as the ratio between
employed individuals aged 16-65 and the entire population aged 16-65).21
In addition we display full-time and part-time participation rates from the
GSOEP, where people self-report whether they have participated in the labor
market, and if so, whether they have participated full-time or part-time.22
Both from the Mikrozensus as well as from the GSOEP we observe an in-
crease in the employment rate prior to uni￿cation, and a subsequent decline.
The GSOEP breakdown also shows a substantial increase in part-time par-
ticipation throughout the sample period, in absolute numbers and even more
dramatically, relative to full-time participation. Note that part-time partic-
ipation is particularly high for women in Germany: about two-thirds of all
working women work part-time.
20We experimented with other household weights and sample selection criteria, without
major changes in the growth rate of per capita consumption between 1978 and 1988 in
the EVS.
21According to this de￿nition, unemployed individuals do contribute to the denominator,
but not the numerator, of this statistic. The source of the aggregate statistics is the
German Mikrozensus, that is, this statistic is based on household data as well (but a
source that is independent of the GSOEP, although the GSOEP uses the Mikrozensus to
obtain sample weights for its households).
22For the participation variable, East German households enter the GSOEP sample in
1990, and the Mikrozensus in 1991. We therefore include two vertical lines into the plot.































Figure 4: Participation Rates, Mikrozensus and GSOEP
Trends in aggregate labor supply are not only caused by changes in par-
ticipation rates over time, but also by changes in average hours worked.
In ￿gure 5 we therefore document average levels of hours of employed (in-
cluding self-employed) individuals, for males, females and the entire sample
in the GSOEP. The corresponding data from NIPA also measure average
hours worked by employed and self-employed combined (￿Erwerbst￿tige￿ ).
All measures of hours therefore exclude individuals that are not employed,
i.e. work zero hours.
For annual hours worked the aggregate statistics show a substantial decline,
roughly by 260 hours, from 1700 hours in 1983 to 1440 hours in 2004. The
decline in hours is fairly uniform across the pre- and post-uni￿cation period.
Comparing hours level and trends to micro data from GSOEP, we ￿rst
observe that GSOEP hours are substantially higher. A large part of the
reason for this di⁄erence is that the household data account for days not
worked due to vacation or sick days only in a very limited way. This upward




































Figure 5: Average Hours Worked, NIPA and GSOEP
bias in average hours is clearly visible in the ￿gure. Second, GSOEP data
do not display a signi￿cant decline in average hours over time, neither for
males nor females.23 To the extent that over the last 25 years vacation
days have increased, not only are GSOEP mean hours likely overstated, but
increasingly overstated.24 In our view, this might partially explain the lack
of decline in average hours worked observed in GSOEP data. However, the
large magnitude of the divergence makes it likely that other determinants of
this divergence between micro and macro data are important as well. This
is an issue that requires further investigation in future work.
23For females, the upward jump in average hours worked between 1990 and 1991 is due
to fact that East German females that enter the sample in 1991 work signi￿cantly longer
hours on average than their West German counterparts.
24The average number of vacation days has increased from about 26 in 1980 to 29.5
in 1994 and has remained farily constant since then (see Bundesministerium f￿r Verkehr,
Bau und St￿dteentwicklung (2007), ￿gure 27). On the other hand, average sick days have
decreased over time.
154 Inequality Trends over Time
After having con￿rmed that our household data sets display the same basic
stylized facts for the levels of per capita income, consumption, and partici-
pation rates (and less so for hours and consequently wages), we now turn to
the main object of interest, the evolution of economic inequality over the last
two decades in Germany. We start with individual wages and hours worked,
and then move to earnings, income, consumption, and wealth.25
4.1 Wage Inequality
Figure 6 displays the evolution over time of four measures of the cross sec-
tional dispersion in wages. The sample based upon which these statistics are
computed include both males and females, and individuals with all levels of
education. From 1991 on the sample includes East German households as
well.26 It does exclude the top 0.5% of wages for each year, because potential
measurement error in hours worked leads to extremely high wage observations
for a small set of households (remember that wages are derived by dividing
reported annual earnings by reported annual hours). The inclusion of these
observations makes especially the pre-uni￿cation inequality measures very
noisy.27 The inequality measures we use (and will continue to use in most of
this paper) are the variance of the log, the 90-50 and 50-10 percentile ratios
25We investigated the precision of our point estimates for the inequality statistics of
selected variables (mainly income and consumption) with the bootstrap. The con￿dence
intervals around the point estimates both from the GSOEP as well as the EVS are small,
rarely exceeding a total size for the 95% con￿dence interval of 6 points for the variance of
the log. We therefore suppress con￿dence intervals in the ￿gures in the paper.
26We devote special attention to the distinction between East and West Germany after
the reun￿cation in section 7. The main problem in merging data for both regions is the
potential for di⁄erences in prices across regions, possibly leading to an understatement of
all real variables in East Germany because of a lower price level there. In the main analysis
we adopt the recommendation of the overall data project and use a common price de￿ ator
for all household types, but a separate one for East and West Germany until 1999.
27The censoring at the top that we employ is not innocuous however, since, as Dustmann
et al. (2007) document, strong wage growth at the very top of the wage distribution is
an important component of the overall picture of German wage inequality trends. When
comparing our results to theirs, this has to be kept in mind. Note, however, that the
percentile ratios are not signi￿cantly (and in the case of the 50-10 ratio, not at all) a⁄ected
by our censoring choice.
16and the Gini coe¢ cient.28
From ￿gure 6 we obtain three main facts, fairly robustly across the di⁄er-
ent inequality measures. First, wage dispersion has not noticeably increased
during the 1980s. The only statistic that shows a signi￿cant increase is the
50-10 ratio, which suggests that to the extent that wage inequality increased
during that period, it did so at the lower end of the distribution.













































































Figure 6: Wage Inequality Trends, 1983-2004
Second, wage inequality rises noticeably between 1990 and 1991 when the
East German sample enters the GSOEP. Third, wage inequality rises in the
1990s, especially after 1997 (while it is roughly ￿ at after the reuni￿cation
jump in 1991 until 1997, and declining for some inequality measures). This
phenomenon is present in all parts of the wage distribution, as all statistics
28Di⁄erent inequality statistics for the same variable are always computed from the same
sample; therefore observations with nonpositive values are always discarded (because the
variance of logs does not permit these values). Unless otherwise noted, no further sample
selection criteria are applied, over and above the sample selection criteria imposed by the
overall data project. In the appendix we discuss the details how the general guidelines for
sample selection were implemented in our German data.
17show a similar trend, but appears most starkly at the lower tail of the distri-
bution. The 50-10 ratio increases from 1.86 to 2.12 between 1997 and 2004,
whereas the 90-50 ratio only increases by 10 points, from 1.73 to 1.83. Com-
pared to the increase in wage inequality in the US, for example, German wage
inequality started to rise about two decades later, and the increase has so far
been modest, even if one includes the composition e⁄ect stemming from the
inclusion of the East German sample in 1991 (in Germany the variance of
log-wages increased by 4 percentage points between 1990 and 2004, relative
to an increase in excess of 10 percentage points in the US between 1975 and
1990).
We now decompose the trends in wage inequality further, in order to ob-
tain a better sense what trends underlie the patterns of roughly unchanged
inequality in West Germany prior to uni￿cation and the somewhat more pro-
nounced increase since then. In ￿gure 7 we plot the trends in the experience
wage premium, the education wage premium, the gender wage premium, and
the trend in residual wage dispersion. The education wage premium is com-
puted as the average wage of a university graduate, divided by the average
wage of an individual without a university degree. Note that the share of
individuals with a university degree in our wage sample is about 20%, signif-
icantly lower than in other European countries and the US.29 The experience
wage premium is calculated as the average wage of individuals of ages 45-55,
relative to the average wage of individuals aged 25-35, whereas the gender
wage premium is the ratio of the average hourly wage of a male individual
divided by the average wage of a female individual. Finally, residual wage
dispersion is measured as the log variance of the residual of a wage regression
on dummies for the individual￿ s education and gender, a quartic in age, and
an East/West dummy that refers to the residence before reuni￿cation. While
there are noteworthy trends in the di⁄erent wage premia (average wages of
females signi￿cantly catching up with those of males throughout the sample,
a small secular increase in the experience premium and a somewhat declining
education premium) residual wage dispersion displays essentially the same
stylized facts as ￿raw￿wage dispersion: it is roughly constant during the
1980s, followed by an increase in the post-uni￿cation years, particularly (but
not exclusively) after 1997.
A unique feature of Germany is the inclusion of a sample of households
29Note, however, that certain (especially technical) degrees that typically would be
earned in college in the US are obtained through vocational training in Germany.
































































































Figure 7: Decomposition of the Trends in Wage Dispersion
from the East in 1991. The West-East wage premium was substantial at 1.75
in 1991 and has since declined to about 1.4 in 2004. Thus while gross wages
are still signi￿cantly higher in the West than in the East, this contributor
to overall wage inequality has lost in importance in the last decade. We will
return to the question how inequality in wages, income and consumption
was a⁄ected by the inclusion of the East German sample in section 7 by
decomposing overall inequality into inequality trends within East and West
Germany, and inequality trends between the two regions.
4.2 Inequality in Hours Worked
To obtain a coherent picture about how inequality in economic welfare has
developed over time it is crucial to document trends in the dispersion of
hours worked. First, time spent not working either generates utility directly
through leisure or indirectly through consumption services from home pro-
duction. Second, hours worked in conjunction with wages determine earnings,
19which are a key determinant of consumption, the second main driving force
of economic welfare.

























































































Figure 8: Trends in the Dispersion of Hours Worked, by Gender
In ￿gure 8 we display the same inequality statistics previously employed
for wages, but now for hours worked. Since average hours worked and par-
ticipation rates vary signi￿cantly between males and females, we plot the
hours-inequality trends separately for both genders. Several observations
are worth mentioning. First, the dispersion of hours worked is substantially
larger among females than males.30 This is mainly due to the much larger
extent of part-time work among females in Germany (of those women that
work, about two-thirds work part-time).31 In terms of inequality trends, the
30The one exception is the 90-50 ratio, which is higher for males due to the more
substantial fraction of males working in jobs with hours that substantially exceed the
typical work week of (at most) 40 hours. The 50th percentile of hours worked is about
300 hours per year higher for males than for females, whereas the 90th percentile displays
men working 500 hours more than females.
31Since we exclude individuals working zero hours when calculating all hours inequality
statistics, the much larger share of females not working does not a⁄ect the level of hours
20(modest) decline in hours inequality among males prior to uni￿cation is vis-
ible for all four statistics; the same appears to be true for females, although
the data is a bit more noisy. Second, post-uni￿cation Germany is charac-
terized by a slight increase of hours inequality for both males and females,
although the magnitudes are smaller than those for wages.
Taking the evidence for wages and hours together we would expect the
trends in wage and hours dispersion to translate into a corresponding (weak)
fall in earnings dispersion prior to the reuni￿cation, and a more pronounced
rise afterwards. Note however, that changes over time in the correlation be-
tween individual wages and hours may lead to trends in earnings (and thus in
income and consumption) inequality that deviate from the previously docu-
mented trends.32 In practice, this point is of minor quantitative importance.
The correlation between wages and hours is very stable over time and slightly
negative at -0.03 for females. For males there is a modest upward trend in the
correlation, from about -0.2 in the mid-80s to approximately zero in 2004.33
In addition, we measure wages and hours on an individual basis, whereas
with earnings and income we will switch our unit of analysis to the house-
hold level. Therefore changes in the correlation of spousal hours and wages
may further complicate the relationship between individual wage and hours
inequality on the one hand and household earnings inequality on the other
hand.
4.3 Earnings Inequality and its Decomposition
As discussed above, the trends in wage and hours inequality suggest that la-
bor earnings inequality should have been roughly constant in the years prior
to uni￿cation and more markedly increased in post-uni￿cation Germany. In
inequality, by construction.
32This is most direct for a one-earner household since then labor earnings y is the
product of the hourly wage w times hours worked h: Thus
V ar(logy) = V ar(logh) + V ar(logw) + 2Cov(logh;logw):
33The correlation between wages and hours is somewhat noisy and may be a⁄ected by
ratio bias if hours are measured with error, since wages are measured as annual earnings
divided by hours. Thus we focus on the trend of the correlation (which should be una⁄ected
by the bias as long as measurement error is constant over time) rather than the slightly
negative levels.
21order to assess this conjecture we now plot the trends in earnings inequal-
ity. Moving from hours and wages to earnings we face the problem that the
former variables are measured on an individual basis whereas earnings and
income are measured on the level of the household. We therefore ￿rst investi-
gate basic earnings inequality trends, and then display how these trends are
potentially shaped by changes in household size and composition, as well as
by changes in the composition of the sample along various dimensions. We
￿nally document the evolution of earnings inequality in more detail for our
preferred measure of household labor earnings.














































































Figure 9: Decomposition of Earnings Inequality
The ￿rst panel of ￿gure 9 contains the time trends of household earnings
inequality, as measured by the variance of log-household earnings, for three
measures of household earnings. These measures are distinguished by the
extent to which we control for observable di⁄erences of households. We plot
inequality in unadjusted household labor earnings and in household earn-
ings adjusted by family size. This adjustment is accomplished (here and for
all other variables discussed below) by dividing the raw observations by the
22OECD equivalence scale.34 Finally we display inequality in residual house-
hold earnings, where the residual is constructed by regressing equivalized
household earnings on dummies for household composition, education, sex
of the household head, a quartic in age and an East/West dummy (for the
data starting from 1991).
We ￿rst observe that using earnings data that are de￿ ated by family size
makes almost no di⁄erence for inequality levels or trends, relative to the raw
data.35 Controlling for observable di⁄erences across households through the
regression not surprisingly reduces earnings inequality. Observables can ac-
count for about 25-30% of the cross-sectional variance in household earnings,
and this fraction is fairly constant, but slightly increasing, over time. In
the second panel we decompose in more detail which observable di⁄erences
across households are mainly responsible for explaining household earnings
di⁄erences.
Before turning to this analysis we want to highlight that, independent
of the earnings measure used, the data show no strong trend in earnings
inequality prior to the German uni￿cation (but a small increase in the years
just prior to uni￿cation), and an upward trend afterwards that is almost
exclusively driven by an increase in earnings inequality after the year 2000.
Overall, the variance in log-household earnings increased by 0.44 in the period
between 1983 and 2004, with about half of this increase attributed to the
years 2000 through 2004. The relative magnitudes for equivalized household
earnings and the earnings residual are similar. Thus the upward trend in
hours and wage inequality in post-uni￿cation Germany (especially in the
most recent years of our sample) translates into a corresponding substantial
increase in household earnings inequality over the last 15 years. On the
other hand, the slight increase in wage dispersion (and the very slight decline
34More precisely, this equivalence scale (sometimes also called the ￿Oxford￿scale), as-
signs a value of 1:0 to the ￿rst household member, a value of 0:7 to each additional adult
and a value of 0:5 to each child (i.e. members 16 and younger).
35Note that
V ar(log(yit=sit)) ￿ V ar(log(yit)) = V ar(log(sit)) ￿ 2Cov(log(yit);log(sit))
Earnings and the equivalence scale are weekly positively correlated in the GSOEP,
roughly o⁄setting the cross-sectional variance in the equivalence scale. Below we will ￿nd
that the equivalence scale is more strongly positively correlated with consumption, and
thus for this variable equivalization will make much more of a di⁄erence for inequality
levels (but not so much for their trends, as we will show below).
23in hours dispersion) prior to uni￿cation manifest themselves in a similarly
modest increase in household earnings inequality (about a 11 points increase
in the variance of log-earnings between 1983 and 1990).
The main ￿nding of our decomposition analysis is that the majority of
earnings inequality is attributable to residual earnings inequality that cannot
be explained by di⁄erences in observable household characteristics. Among
the observable characteristics, the education level of the household accounts
for most of the explained cross-sectional variance (close to 50% on average
over the sample years), see the bottom panel of ￿gure 9. Here education is
measured by a complete set of dummies for the highest education level of the
household head and spouse, with the education level being measured as either
completed college, completed vocational training, completed high school or
no high school completion. The other observable characteristics (household
age, composition, gender of the head) account for a non-negligible, but rather
modest 10% share of the overall cross-sectional variance in log-earnings. The
East-West dummy is most important directly after the East sample enters,
but then its importance diminishes over time. We will con￿rm the declining
importance of East-West di⁄erences for overall German inequality in our
analysis in section 7 below.
We now plot the time trend of equivalized (by the OECD equivalence
scale) household log-earnings inequality for various inequality measures in
￿gure 10. The substantial increase in earnings inequality after the uni￿cation
is clearly visible for all measures employed. In contrast, the picture prior to
uni￿cation is more dispersed. In the 1980s the 90-50 ratio, the 50-10 ratio and
the Gini suggest rather constant earnings inequality, whereas the variance of
log-earnings (as documented above) displays a modest increase.
4.4 From Wage to Income Inequality
Before turning to consumption and wealth inequality we want to document
to what extent inequality trends in individual labor market opportunities and
decisions (that is, wages and hours) translate into inequality trends in house-
hold consumption and savings opportunities, as proxied by various measures
of income.
In ￿gure 11 we therefore display the variance of various log-income mea-
sures (wages, earnings, adding private and then public transfers and taxes),
starting from wages of the head of the household, and ending at household
disposable income. We compute all inequality statistics for the nonequival-























































































Figure 10: Trends in Earnings Inequality
ized (by household size) data. As the previous analysis documented, whether
one uses equivalization or not does not a⁄ect the results for earning and in-
come in a signi￿cant way. Similarly, in ￿gure 12 we display the corresponding
￿gure with inequality measured by the Gini coe¢ cient.
As documented above for the entire sample (not only household heads
as displayed here), the cross-sectional variance of wages of household heads
is roughly stable prior to uni￿cation and has increased since then. In fact,
conditioning on household heads only, wage inequality in the 1980s in West
Germany is even ￿ atter (showing a slight decline by 1.5 points between 1984
and 1990) than for the entire wage sample. Inequality in earnings (of house-
hold heads as well as overall household earnings) show a more pronounced
increase in inequality after uni￿cation, while there is no noticeable increase in
inequality prior to 1991 for earnings of heads, but more of an increase in to-
tal household earnings. In terms of levels, head earnings are more unequally
distributed than head wages. This in turn is due to the fact that household
head log-hours have a substantially positive variance. The covariance be-
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Figure 11: From Wage Inequality to Disposable Income Inequality
tween wages and hours of household heads, on the other hand, is negative36
(but increasing over time).
Similarly, household earnings show a larger cross-sectional dispersion than
earnings of household heads, indicating a positive correlation between earn-
ings of heads and other members of the household. Adding private transfers
to household earnings makes no di⁄erence for cross-sectional inequality trends
as these transfers are quite small for just about all households. Finally, and
possibly most importantly, we observe that the government tax and trans-
fer system reduces the level of income inequality, relative to pre-government
earnings concepts, and substantially a⁄ects its trend as well.37 For the entire
sample the variance of disposable household income is only about 69% of
36As described before, this might be due to a ratio bias, since wages are computed as
earnings divided by hours.
37By moving from earnings to disposable income we also add asset income to earnings.
Asset income, although substantially unequally distributed, is small for most households in
the GSOEP and thus does not strongly a⁄ect the measured inequality trends for income.
26that of pre-tax household earnings, and that ratio fell from about 80% to
close to 50% at the end of our sample.
Investigating the time path of disposable income inequality we observe
that it slightly fell prior to uni￿cation (by about 2 points, from 0.38 to 0.36)
and then only slightly rose in the next 15 years after that, from 0.38 in 1991
(the ￿rst year the East sample is in our data set) to 0.42 in 2004. As a point
of comparison the variance of pre-tax household earnings rose by 29 points,
from 0.57 to 0.86, in the post-uni￿cation period from 1991 to 2004.
To summarize our discussion of a wide range of earnings and income mea-
sures: in the second half of the 1980s wage, earnings and income inequality
did not rise substantially, if at all. This trend changed after the German
uni￿cation, with all measures of pre-tax earnings and incomes displaying
a substantial upward trend. This rise in inequality in market incomes did
not, however, fully translate into an equally signi￿cant increase in dispos-
able household income inequality, leading us to conclude that the govern-
ment tax-transfer system worked rather e⁄ectively, up until 2004, in provid-
ing income insurance/redistribution.3839 Figure 12 documents that, at least
qualitatively, the stylized facts just described are robust to using the Gini
coe¢ cient rather than the variance of logs as our summary inequality mea-
sure. We notice though that the Gini displays a somewhat more pronounced
increase in disposable income inequality in post-uni￿cation Germany than
the variance of logs, especially after 1998. However, this increase in the Gini
is still signi￿cantly smaller than that of household earnings, consistent with
what the variance of logs displayed.
Given the apparent importance of the public tax and transfer system in
mitigating the increasing trend in earnings and income inequality, we de-
compose the importance of taxes and public transfers for keeping income
inequality from rising faster. In ￿gure 13 we display, in deviation from
the 1984 values (in order to more clearly visualize relative magnitudes of
38This is a purely positive statement and is not meant to deny the potentially detrimental
e⁄ects this system had on household income levels and growth rates. It is quite possible
that the massive slowdown in per capita income growth may be in part caused by exactly
the policies that seem to have kept disposable income inequality rather constant despite
a strong upward trend in pre-tax household earnings inequality.
39For an analysis of equivalized disposable income inequality in post uni￿cation Germany
that focuses on particular income percentiles and the Gini coe¢ cient, see Grabka and Frick
(2008). They document qualitatively similar trends, but ￿nd a somewhat larger increase
in disposable earnings inequality starting roughly from the year 2000 on (as we do for all
pre-government income inequality measures).
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Figure 12: From Wage Inequality to Disposable Income Inequality: Gini
Coe¢ cients
changes), the variance of four logged income measures: household earnings
including private transfers, the same measure net of taxes, the same measure
including public transfers and ￿nally disposable income. The ￿gure paints a
sharp picture about the relative importance of taxes versus public transfers
for shaping income inequality trends. While the income tax system plays
an important role in curbing the substantial increase in earnings inequality
starting in the mid-1990, public transfers seem to play a substantially larger
role in insulating disposable income inequality from much of the increased
inequality in market earnings (again note that the line that includes transfers
does not subtract taxes from earnings).40
40Public transfers are de￿ned as the sum of individual public transfers ￿student grants,
maternity bene￿ts, unemployment bene￿ts, unemployment assistance, subsistence al-
lowance and transition pay ￿over all individuals in the household, plus household bene￿ts
￿housing allowances, child bene￿ts, nursing care insurance, direct housing subsidy , sub-
sistence assistance, support for special circumstances, social assistance for elderly and un-



















































Figure 13: The Importance of Taxes and Transfers
While it is di¢ cult to speculate about the future evolution of inequality,
given the documented importance of public transfers in ￿gure 13 and the
substantial reforms of the public transfer system through the Agenda 2010
in 2003 it is plausible that future increases in inequality in market incomes
will translate more strongly into inequality of disposable incomes than was
the case in the previous two decades.
4.5 Consumption Inequality
While income inequality trends are interesting in their own right, to the
extent that households can (self-) insure against at least temporary ￿ uctua-
employment bene￿t II (welfare). To this we add social security bene￿ts and pensions, i.e.
the sum of old-age, disability, and widowhood social security pensions. This include pay-
ments of the German Pension Insurance (GRV), Miner￿ s social Insurance (Knappschaft),
Civil Servant Pension (Beamtenpension), War Victim Bene￿ts (Kriegsopferversorgung),
Farmer￿ s Bene￿ts and accident pension (GUV).
29tions in income, the cross-sectional consumption distribution (together with
the distribution of hours worked) may be more informative about the cross-
sectional distribution of economic welfare than the corresponding income
distribution. We therefore now document consumption inequality trends for
Germany in the last 25 years.
Unfortunately the GSOEP, the data set we used so far for wages, earn-
ings and income inequality, contains no useful information about household
consumption. We therefore turn to the EVS, a household consumption sur-
vey conducted only once every ￿ve years. While both GSOEP and EVS are
constructed with the explicit goal of being representative of the German pop-
ulation and while we employed exactly the same sample selection criteria on
both data sets, we cannot overcome the problem that the timing of income
observations from GSOEP and consumption inequality observations from
EVS di⁄er. In particular, for the period prior to German uni￿cation we have
only one year (1988) for which both GSOEP income and EVS consumption
inequality data are available.
With these caveats in mind we now display, in ￿gures 14 and 15, the
basic trends in consumption inequality from the EVS. These ￿gures are the
counterparts to the household earnings inequality trends displayed in ￿g-
ures 9 and 10. Figure 14 contains the decomposition of the cross-sectional
consumption dispersion into parts predictable by household size and other
observables, whereas ￿gure 15 displays consumption inequality trends for
various inequality measures.
From the ￿rst panel of ￿gure 14 we learn that, in contrast to earnings, a
much larger share of the log-variance in household consumption is explained
by di⁄erences in household size. While for household earnings equivaliza-
tion by household size hardly changed levels and trends of earnings disper-
sion, for consumption household size accounts for about 28% of the over-
all dispersion in household consumption (with its importance signi￿cantly
growing over time).41 Furthermore, the fraction of the variance of equival-
ized log-consumption inequality accounted for by other observable household
characteristics (apart from household size) is signi￿cantly smaller than for
earnings. Among the regressors, household composition has by far the most
explanatory power for consumption (for earnings it was education), whereas
41This in turn is due to the fact that household size and household consumption are
much more strongly (and increasingly so, over time) positively correlated than is household
size and household earnings.















































































Figure 14: Decomposition of Consumption Inequality
the fraction of the equivalized household consumption variance explained by
household age and gender of the head is negligible. The fact that household
age is signi￿cantly more important for explaining income than consumption
is not surprising from a life-cycle theoretic perspective, as long as households
have access to some mechanisms (such as ￿nancial markets) that allow them
to smooth their consumption. The East dummy, from 1993 on, explains a
noticeable, but declining part of cross-sectional consumption inequality. Fi-
nally note that we have detailed information about educational attainment
in the EVS only from 1993 onwards, so that this regressor plays no role prior
to 1993 by construction. Afterwards it is the second most important deter-
minant of consumption dispersion, although its importance is not nearly as
large as that for earnings.
Turning to levels and trends in consumption inequality we ￿rst note that
both unadjusted, and to an ever larger extent equivalized consumption are
signi￿cantly more equally distributed than is the corresponding measure of
household disposable income (which in turn is signi￿cantly more equally dis-
31tributed than household pre-tax earnings, see ￿gure 11). Second, consump-
tion inequality did rise between 1978 and 1988 in West Germany, especially
between 1983 and 1988, fell between 1988 and 1993 and then displayed an
increase again in post-uni￿cation Germany between 1993 and 2003. The size
of these changes over time di⁄er somewhat depending on the extent to which
we control for the e⁄ects of observables on household consumption, but they
are rather small in general. Focusing on equivalized household consumption
we ￿nd an increase in the log-variance of two points between 1978 and 1988,
a decline by one point from 1988 to 1993 and an increase of two points since
then.42


























































































Figure 15: Trends in Non-Durable Consumption Inequality
42Note that the EVS changed the frequency at which consumption expenditures are
collected from annual to quarterly periods from 1993 to 1998. While this should have
the strongest impact on the cross-sectional dispersion of consumption expenditures for
items bought infrequently, such as consumer durable goods, which are not included in
our nondurable consumption measure, we cannot exclude the possibility that part of the
change in consumption inequality between 1993 and 1998 is due to this change in sample
design.
32As ￿gure 15 displays, other inequality statistics paint a similar picture:
a very modest upward trend in consumption inequality with a small decline
when the East German sample enters between 1988 and 1993.43
Overall, the rather ￿ at trend of consumption inequality coincides rather
well with the similar trend observed for disposable household income in-
equality. In ￿gure 16 we plot our various measures of inequality jointly for
equivalized nondurable consumption and equivalized disposable income, both
from GSOEP and EVS data. While disposable income is somewhat (and sig-
ni￿cantly so at the lower end of the distribution) more unequally distributed
than is consumption44, the inequality trends (or lack thereof) line up rather
well between the two variables. To make sure that this is not an artefact
of using two di⁄erent data sets for income and consumption, ￿gure 16 in-
cludes trends of disposable income inequality as measured from the EVS.
The fact that disposable income and consumption inequality display very
similar trends is robust to using EVS income data (and thus robust to using
exactly the same sample of households for measuring both consumption and
income inequality).
4.6 Wealth Levels and Wealth Inequality
So far we have documented that while wage and earnings (and to a lesser
extent, hours) inequality have increased in post-uni￿cation Germany after
showing a fairly stable trend in the pre-uni￿cation years, the increase in after-
tax income and consumption inequality has been rather modest. We ￿nally
investigate whether wealth inequality shares the same trends as earnings or
consumption/disposable income. Before turning to the inequality statistics
we ￿rst display trends for average net wealth (expressed as a ratio to income).
These statistics are useful as calibration targets for macroeconomic models
43Due to the 5 year intervals between observations the inclusion of the East sample in
1993 may, but need not explain the temporary drop in consumption inequality. Splitting
the sample between East and West German households we do observe, however, that
consumption was signi￿cantly more equally distributed in the East in 1993 than in the
West (and average consumption was only slightly lower in the East than in the West),
thus potentially explaining why overall consumption inequality dropped in 1993. By 2003
consumption inequality in the East had caught up almost to West German levels. See
section 7 for further details on this point.
44See the 50-10 ratio and the variance of logs, which puts more emphasis on the lower

























































































Figure 16: From Disposable Income to Consumption Inequality
as the amount of aggregate wealth in the economy determines how e⁄ectively
households can self-insure against idiosyncratic risk through precautionary
saving (see e.g. Storesletten et al., 2004). In the two top panels of ￿gure 17
we display the ratio between net ￿nancial wealth and disposable income, as
well as the same ratio for net total wealth (which in addition to net ￿nancial
wealth includes net wealth in real estate). Two main observations stand out.
First, German households hold most of their net wealth in real estate, rather
than ￿nancial wealth. Roughly speaking, 70% of net worth of Germans
comes in the form of real estate, with that fraction falling somewhat over
time.45 Second, the wealth to income ratio has increased fairly signi￿cantly
over time, from about 3 to 3.5 in the last 25 years. This happened despite
the fact that between 1988 and 1993 the East German sample entered the
EVS, and average wealth in the East was substantially lower than in the
West, the reason being that disposable income also was substantially lower
45This is even more remarkable when noting that only about 50% of Germans own real
estate.
34in the East. As a result, the wealth to income ratio did not increase between
1988 and 1993; it did increase for West Germans but this increase is o⁄set by
the composition e⁄ect of the East German households entering the sample.









































































































































Figure 17: Trends in Wealth Inequality
The bottom two panels of ￿gure 17 show that while average wealth hold-
ings have increased, wealth inequality has done so, too. We measure wealth
inequality by the Gini coe¢ cient of household equivalized wealth, in order to
account for the fact that a non-negligible fraction of households reports zero
or negative net worth. The fraction of households reporting zero or negative
wealth increased from 6.5% in 1978 to 10.5% in 2003, while the fraction of
those households with negative wealth increased from 3.3% to 5.5%. The
increase in total wealth inequality is concentrated between 1988 and 1993
and is partially due to the di⁄erence in wealth levels between East and West
Germans in 1993. However, even within West German households a modest
increase in wealth inequality between 1988 and 1993, and after 1993, oc-
curred. Overall the wealth Gini coe¢ cient for total wealth has increased by
356 points, from 0.63 to 0.69. As a point of comparison, the corresponding in-
creases in disposable income and consumption inequality (all measured from
the EVS) are 3.4 points and 2.4 points, correspondingly. Thus the increase
in wealth inequality, while slightly larger overall due to the larger composi-
tion e⁄ect in 1993 from the entering East German sample, are of comparable
magnitude and timing than those for disposable income and consumption
inequality.46
On the other hand, wealth inequality in ￿nancial assets has increased
much more rapidly. Financial wealth is now slightly more unequally distrib-
uted than total wealth, while its Gini in 1978 was seven points lower than
that of total wealth. A large part of these trends is due to di⁄erential trends
in the prices of houses and stocks in Germany. The level of real estate wealth
has essentially not increased, in real terms, partially because there was vir-
tually no appreciation of house prices during the sample period (very much
in contrast to most other industrialized countries). At the same time the
prices of ￿nancial assets (relative to the CPI) have increased substantially.
Consequently, at constant portfolio allocations one would expect increased
inequality in ￿nancial wealth (with those holding assets whose prices appreci-
ated gaining disproportionately) but no change in housing wealth inequality.
This is exactly what the wealth inequality data display.
5 Inequality Trends over the Life Cycle
So far we have documented how inequality in Germany has changed over
time. In order to empirically inform structural macro models that have an
explicit life cycle structure, in this section we discuss how inequality in income
and consumption evolves over the life cycle. While for the U.S. empirical
studies documenting these facts exist,47 the evidence from our German data
46Also note that the level of wealth inequality is signi￿cantly lower than that in the U.S.,
even after German reuni￿cation. So is the (still substantial) share of households with zero
or negative net worth.
47See Deaton and Paxson (1994), Storesletten et al. (2004) or Heathcote et al. (2005),
among others.
36sources is new, to the best of our knowledge.48 49
In ￿gure 18 we plot the variance of logs of four variables against age:
wages, earnings equivalized by household size, disposable income equival-
ized by household size (all from the GSOEP), and consumption corrected
by household size (from the EVS). In order to generate these plots one has
to take a stand on the importance of time and cohort e⁄ects. Since time,
age and birth year are perfectly collinear, we cannot separately identify age,
time and cohort e⁄ects. Therefore we derive the age-inequality e⁄ects under
two di⁄erent assumptions about the presence of time and cohort e⁄ects, and
plot them jointly in the ￿gure. We implement age, cohort and time e⁄ects (if
present) by a full set of dummies, and plot the age pro￿le in deviation from
the age 25-29 values.
The ￿rst observation we make from ￿gure 18 is that the choice of whether
to control for time or for cohort e⁄ects is an important one. For all variables
under study the increase in intra-cohort inequality over the life cycle is sub-
stantially more pronounced with cohort e⁄ects present than in the speci￿-
cation that includes only time e⁄ects.50 These di⁄erences are quantitatively
important: for wages and consumption life cycle inequality, as measured by
the variance of logs, increases by about 7-9 points more with cohort than
with time e⁄ects; for earnings the di⁄erence is 40 points.
Second, we observe that wages, disposable income and consumption dis-
play a monotonic increase in inequality as a cohort ages. However, the overall
increase in inequality is rather small over the life cycle, certainly when com-
pared to similar ￿gures for the U.S. The log-variance for wages increases
by 7 points with time e⁄ects and 16 points with cohort e⁄ects between age
groups of 25-29 and 60-64. The same statistic for disposable income remains
￿ at (time e⁄ects) and rises by 8 points (cohort e⁄ects), and for consumption
rises by 7 points (time e⁄ects) and 13 points (cohort e⁄ects).
The life cycle inequality pro￿le for equivalized earnings, on the other hand
displays substantial relative inequality among the 25-35 year old households,
48For this exercise we only use the West German sample in order to not contaminate
our analysis by the unbalanced nature of the panel that the inclusion of the East German
sample constitutes.
49A very recent working paper by Bayer and Juessen provides similar evidence for wages
and compares the life cycle inequality trends in Germany to those in the US and UK. Their
￿ndings for Germany line up well with ours.
50Heathcote et al. (2005) ￿nd exactly the same pattern for the U.S. and argue for the
speci￿cation with time e⁄ects.







































































































































Figure 18: Life Cycle Inequality Facts
a decline towards middle ages, and then a substantial increase after age 40.
The U-shaped pattern of life cycle inequality for earnings is especially pro-
nounced in the absence of cohort e⁄ects; but even controlling for these life
cycle inequality falls until age 35-39. Part of the high relative earnings in-
equality among younger cohorts is the noticeable incidence of unemployment
among these age groups.51 Furthermore, especially for the youngest cohort a
fair share of individuals are still in vocational training, which is compensated
much worse than regular work, partially because an important part of the
time spent in these jobs is devoted to human capital accumulation rather
than production. Finally, students in Germany typically do not leave univer-
sity until their middle to late twenties, adding another group that has very
51Unemployed individuals with recorded zero wages do not enter the sample on which
life cycle wage inequality is computed. On the other hand, these individuals enter the
earnings sample if other household members have positive earnings. Notice that there is
no initial decline in the life cycle inequality plot for wages.
38low (but typically not zero, due to part-time jobs) earnings.52 53
Taken jointly, the life cycle inequality pictures con￿rm our time series ob-
servations: over the life cycle earnings inequality increases more substantially
than wage inequality, but this increase does not translate into a correspond-
ingly large increase in disposable income or consumption inequality. These
￿ndings again suggest, now from a life cycle perspective that over the sample
period the German tax and transfer system has acted as an important factor
mitigating the rise in economic inequality.
6 A Stochastic Wage and Earnings Process
for Germany
Our analysis so far used exclusively cross-sectional information from the EVS
and the GSOEP to document inequality trends over time and over the life
cycle. In this section we document results from estimating a stochastic wage
and earnings process from the GSOEP, explicitly making use of the long panel
dimension available in the GSOEP. We view this exercise as interesting for
two independent reasons. First, stochastic wage or earnings processes of the
form we estimate are a crucial input into quantitative models with household
heterogeneity, independent of whether these models contain an explicit life
cycle structure or not. Second, the results from our panel estimation may
help us to further interpret the trends in wage and earnings inequality in the
cross section that we have documented above in section 4.54
52While U.S data may also display the U-shaped age-earnings inequality pro￿le that we
document here (see e.g. ￿gure 3, panel 3 of Huggett et al., 2004) the decline sets in much
earlier in the life cycle (it is typically complete by age 25) and is not nearly as severe
as in our German data. On the other hand, the phenomena mentioned in the main text
(vocational training, youth unemployment, late entry into the labor market by students)
are not very prevalent in the U.S. either.
53A U-shaped age-inequality pro￿le can also emerge if the stochastic process for earnings
has a ￿xed e⁄ect and a random growth component, as recently advocated by Guvenen
(2007). If the random growth component is negatively correlated with the ￿xed e⁄ect, the
cross-sectional earnings variance of a cohort can ￿rst fan in and then fan out (depending
on the size of the correlation and the variance of the random growth component).
54Biewen (2005) estimates a slightly di⁄erent stochastic process for GSOEP equivalized
disposable income data from 1990 to 1998, separately for West and East German house-
holds. Because of the di⁄erences in the economic variable used and the process being
estimated, his results cannot be directly compared to ours.
39As many authors in the literature (e.g. Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004) we
estimate a parsimonious stochastic process for wages and earnings that allows
for temporary and permanent shocks, and allows the size of the shocks to
vary over time. More precisely we estimate the statistical model
lnyi;t = x
0
i;t t + zi;t (1)
where here yi;t stands either for wages of individual i or labor earnings of
household i at time t: The vector of controls xi;t includes year dummies, dum-
mies for family composition, a quartic polynomial in the age of the household
head, education dummies, and an East-West dummy.55 All regressors have
time-varying coe¢ cients  t: The stochastic component of wages or earnings
zi;t is assumed to follow the process






where the persistent component of the process pi;t is assumed to take the
form of a random walk







We assume that both the permanent and the transitory shock ￿i;t and "i;t
are i.i.d. across agents (individuals or households) and time. As highlighted
above we allow both the variance ￿2
";t of the transitory component and the
variance ￿2
￿;t of the permanent shock to be time-varying.
This process is typically estimated by a minimum distance estimator that
selects estimates for (￿2
";t;￿2
￿;t) together with ￿2
p0 in order to minimize the
weighted sum of squared distances between selected moments implied by the
statistical model and the corresponding moments in the data. The moments
commonly used are either autocovariances in levels, covt(zi;t;zi;t￿j) or auto-
covariances in ￿rst di⁄erences covt(￿zi;t;￿zi;t￿j); both of which can be used
to estimate the variances of interest. Note that as long as the statistical
model is not mis-speci￿ed, using either set of moments should deliver similar
results.56 Unfortunately the results vary substantially across the moments
being used, thus below we document results based on both sets of moments.
55We repeated our estimation with data from only West German individuals/households
and found results very similar to the ones reported here.
56For further details on the estimation procedure using ￿rst di⁄erences, see the instruc-
tions of the overall project, Krueger et al. (this issue). The U.S. paper (Heathcote et al.,
this issue) explains in more detail how the model is estimated when using level moment
40Since our estimates derived from levels appear to be more plausible based
on the evidence on the level of wage and earnings dispersion as well as their
trend over the life cycle, we present them ￿rst. The top panel of ￿gure 19
plots, against time, the variance of transitory and permanent wage shocks,
and the bottom panel does the same for earnings. Note that, as before, the
wage of a household refers to the wage of the household head. We make
several observations. First transitory shocks are signi￿cantly larger than
permanent shocks (but note that the latter accumulate over a person￿ s life).
Second, the magnitude of transitory shocks has no time trend; it is completely
￿ at for wages and increases and then declines to its original level for household
earnings. Third, the size of permanent shocks, while constant and small in
the pre-uni￿cation years, has increased since, with the increase particularly
pronounced since 1998 for earnings. For wages, ￿2
￿ is larger on average after
1991 than before, but permanent wage shocks remain fairly small. Fourth,
the shocks to wages are signi￿cantly smaller than those to household earnings.
These ￿ndings are consistent with the cross-sectional inequality facts we
have presented so far, and they also square well with the dynamics of in-
equality over the life cycle (at least if one focuses on the speci￿cation with
cohort e⁄ects present). In terms of levels, inequality in household earnings
is substantially larger than that in wages. Viewed in light of the estimates
presented here part of this di⁄erence is due to the fact that wages are subject
to smaller shocks than household earnings. For changes over time, inequality
in wages and earnings did not rise in West Germany prior to uni￿cation, and
the shocks to the stochastic part of the households wages and earnings have
not become larger. The increase in inequality since then, most pronounced
since 1998 and more pronounced for earnings than for wages can, at least in
part, be attributed to larger permanent shocks, whereas temporary shocks
remained constant.57 Inequality over the life cycle rises very slowly for wages
and more substantially (but still slowly, compared to the U.S. case) for earn-
conditions; we follow their approach closely. We deviate form their approach in one im-
portant dimension. They target autocovariances that are allowed to di⁄er by year, lag and
age of the households whereas we only target covariances indexed by year and lag, in e⁄ect
averaging over households with di⁄erent ages. The advantage of this approach is that each
covariance we target is precisely estimated in the data (as cell sizes are large), the disad-
vantage is that we, relative to Heathcote et al., have fewer moments for the estimation
and thus larger standard errors for the estimated variances.
57Of course our empirical results beg the question why wage shocks have become more
permanent, and the permanent shocks have become larger.
41ings, which is consistent with permanent shocks being generally small but
relatively more important for earnings than for wages. We take the fact that
the estimation of stochastic wage and earnings processes paint, broadly, the
same picture as our analyses of inequality over time and the life cycle as
reassuring for our overall results.




















































































Figure 19: Stochastic Wage/Earnings Processes: Estimation in Levels
Unfortunately the results based on the moment conditions in ￿rst di⁄er-
ences are not entirely consistent with the results displayed so far. In ￿gure 20
we plot the estimates of the variances of the transitory and permanent shocks
based on the moments in ￿rst di⁄erences. As with estimates based on levels
the size of transitory shocks displays essentially no time trend whereas per-
manent shocks are larger in the post-uni￿cation than in the pre-uni￿cation
period. Thus, as before the ratio ￿2
￿;t=￿2
";t is increasing over time (the ratio
declines slightly for earnings in the very last years of the sample). Also as
before, the shocks to household earnings are larger than those to wages.
The main divergence in results between using level and ￿rst di⁄erence
moments is the size of permanent relative to transitory shocks. Permanent

















































































Figure 20: Stochastic Wage/Earnings Processes: Estimation in Growth Rates
shocks are an order of magnitude larger when estimated based on ￿rst di⁄er-
ences, and transitory shocks are somewhat smaller. As point of comparison,
the average (over time) variance of permanent shocks is ￿2
￿ = 0:016 when es-
timated using levels, but ￿2
￿ = 0:094 when using ￿rst di⁄erences. The latter
appears to be unreasonably large. For example, a completely homogeneous
cohort of households that starts receiving earnings shocks at age 27 following
the process we speci￿ed would display an increase in the cross-sectional vari-
ance of log earnings of 3.29 from age 27 to age 63 with the estimates derived
from ￿rst di⁄erences. This compares with an increase of 0.56 based on the
estimates using levels and with an increase of 0.43 in the data, see ￿gure
18, upper-right panel.58 In addition, the level of cross-sectional wage and
58While the estimation of the stochastic processes controls for observables of households
and the life cycle inequality plots do not, it seems implausible to us that the reduction
in inequality of earnings due to the reduction in the dispersion of observables over the
life cycle is so massive that it could counteract the large increase in life cycle earnings
inequality implied by the size of the permament shock as estimated on ￿rst di⁄erences.
43earnings dispersion implied by the ￿rst di⁄erence estimates is implausibly
large, relative to what we have documented in section 4. Therefore, based
on the overall ￿ndings documented in the paper, we view the level estimates
as a more reasonable description of the amount and persistence of wage and
earnings risk German households face.59
7 The German Reuni￿cation as a Large Ex-
ogenous Shock
So far, with a few exceptions we have treated data of households living in
East Germany symmetric to West German households from the time the
East households joined the GSOEP and the EVS data. In this section we
decompose some of the inequality trends documented above into inequality
changes within the East, within the West and changes in inequality between
the Eastern and the Western parts of the country. Since the EVS only
reports the current residence, not the residence at reuni￿cation, we rely on
the current residence for this decomposition.
Note that between 1991 and 2006, net East-West migration amounted to
1.45 million people, with gross ￿ ows of 2.45 million people migrating from
East to West, and 1 million people the other way round.60 The population in
East Germany fell from 14.5 million at the end of 1991 to 13.2 million people
at the end of 2006, with the West German population grew from 59.7 million
to 62.9 million people.61 Migrants are clearly a self-selected group, with
young and increasingly more educated people exhibiting a higher propensity
to migrate from East to West (Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln and Sch￿ndeln, 2009). This
59Of course this conclusion leaves the important issue of model misspeci￿cation open. If
the model is correctly speci￿ed using both moment conditions should give similar estimates
(identical estimates asymptotically, and we ￿nd it hard to believe that small sample bias
explains the huge deviations among the estimates). Thus the results are suggestive of
the fact that the simple permanent vs. transitory shock decomposition employed here is
insu¢ cient to describe wage and earnings shocks faced by German households. Bayer and
Juessen (2009) estimate a process similar to ours but allow the persistent shock to be less
than fully permanent. They estimate a persistence parameter for wages in the order of
magnitude of 0:9:
60These numbers count people going back and forth between both parts of Germany
several times.
61These numbers exclude (East and West) Berlin. The population in Berlin decreased
slightly between 1991 and 2006, from 3.45 million to 3.4 million.
44should be kept in mind when interpreting the decomposition results.
One of the attractive features of the use of variance of a variable as in-
equality statistic is that it can be decomposed into within-group and between-
group inequality. For the German case the unique event of the reuni￿cation
determines as the most interesting characteristic of a group the region of
residence, that is, the East-West distinction. We can write the variance of
the log of a variable y as62
￿





































and N is the number of population. Thus the inequality of a variable of
interest can be decomposed into inequality in the East, inequality in the West
and inequality between the East and the West (the last term in brackets in
equation (3)). Note that if East and West German data were drawn from
the same population distribution, then ￿2
East = ￿2
West = ￿2 and the last term
would be zero. If, on the other hand, there is dispersion in the means between
East and West (as is the case for all economic variables we are interested
in), then the last term is positive and contributes to overall inequality in
Germany.
This decomposition can now be used to disaggregate the trend in in-
equality into its underlying sources. In particular, the change in measured
62For ease of reading, we suppress a time subscript.









































The ￿rst term is the change in within-group inequality due to within region
changes of variances, the second term is the change in within-group inequality
due to changes in population shares between East and West, the third term
is the change in between-group inequality due to changes in relative means
between East and West, and the fourth term is the change in between-group
inequality due to changes in the relative size of the household population
between East and West. We will now use this decomposition for decomposing
inequality trends into East versus West and within the two regions.63 Also
note that this decomposition is particularly clean if the relative size of the




















In ￿gure 21 we plot the variances of log wages for males, log household
earnings, log equivalized disposable income (from GSOEP) and log equival-
ized consumption (from EVS) both for West Germany and East Germany,
as well as Germany as a whole. Prior to 1991 (1993 for consumption in
the EVS) the entire sample is composed of West German households, so the
lines for West Germany and total Germany exactly coincide. From 1991
onward (1993 in the EVS) the East German sample enters, and, as shown
above, the variance of wages, earnings, income and consumption in uni￿ed
Germany equals the weighted sum of the region-speci￿c log-variances, plus
the dispersion in the log-means (not plotted here).
In Table I we display the results of the decomposition analysis for inequal-
ity of male wages, household earnings, disposable income and consumption
(the latter two variables equivalized). In order to not let our results overly
be in￿ uenced by high frequency ￿ uctuations for the GSOEP variables we
63This decomposition is essentially the same as the one employed by Schwarze (1996)
for the so-called Theil I(0) inequality index.















































































































Figure 21: Variance of Wages, Earnings and Income in East and West Ger-
many
average the cross-sectional variances over the last three years prior to uni￿-
cation, 1988-90 (and denote the averaged variance as ￿2
1988)64, we average the
variances for the ￿rst three years after uni￿cation, 1991-93 (denoted as ￿2
1993)
and we average the variances for the last three years in our survey (denoted
as ￿2
2003). For the EVS we take the cross-sectional variance for the last year
prior to uni￿cation (1988), the ￿rst year after uni￿cation for which data are
available (1993) and the last year of the sample (2003).65
64This variance is computed on the sample of West German households only, as the East
Germn households only enter the sample after the uni￿cation.
65The observations for c=s from the EVS refer to 1988, 1993 and 2003, rather than
88-90, 91-93 and 2002-04. To compute the consumption variances and means in this table
we used the regional weights from the EVS which make sure that the results are both
representative in the former East and the former West. All previous results were based on
national weights, assuring that the results are representative for the country as a whole.
While the results of the previous analyses are not signi￿cantly a⁄ected by which weighting
we use, in the decomposition analysis the fact that national weights do not assure that
the appropriate share of Eastern Germans are present makes them inappropriate for the
47Table I: Variance Decomposition
Variable wm yL yD yD=s c=s
￿2
1988 0.186 0.484 0.365 0.316 0.202
￿2
1993 0.236 0.574 0.385 0.328 0.195
￿2
E;1993 0.185 0.501 0.331 0.212 0.126
￿2
W;1993 0.192 0.569 0.389 0.342 0.198
￿2
EW;1993 0.045 0.017 0.006 0.009 0.010
￿2
2003 0.272 0.748 0.423 0.348 0.214
￿2
E;2003 0.260 0.803 0.422 0.279 0.165
￿2
W;2003 0.250 0.725 0.415 0.356 0.220
￿2
EW;2003 0.020 0.010 0.007 0.005 0.004
Several observations stand out. First, as documented above, the increase
in inequality in earnings is substantially larger than that of disposable in-
come and consumption, directly after the uni￿cation and in the subsequent
ten years. Second, initially wages, earnings, incomes and consumption are
more equally distributed in the East than in the West. However, this fact
is reversed a decade after the uni￿cation. With the exception of equivalized
disposable income and consumption, inequality in the East has caught up,
in fact slightly surpassed, that in West Germany.66 This is due to a strong
increase in inequality in the East (even with respect to disposable income
and consumption), and a noticeable, but much more modest increase in the
West. Third, right after reuni￿cation there did exist substantial di⁄erences
between East and West German means, especially for wages and earnings.
Fourth, we observe some convergence in (male) wages and earnings (that is,
in variables that do not contain taxes and transfers by the government) as
well as equivalized consumption between the East and the West in the decade
following German uni￿cation.67
To further decompose the changes in inequality between 1991-1993 and
2002-2004, we now display, in table II, the contributions that changes in
purpose, and we therefore switched to regional weights.
66Biewen (2001) measures the contribution of the decline in female labor force par-
ticipation and rising unemployment on equivalized disposable income inequality in East
Germany and ￿nds that both factors contributed considerably to its increase between 1990
and 1995.
67Note that this convergence could partially be a result of migration. However, since
individuals/households with high wages and incomes (or wage and income potentials), if
they migrated, tended to migrate from the East to the West, we conjecture that migration
was a negative force on convergence.
48inequality in the East (row 3), changes in inequality in the West (row 4),
changes in the population shares (row 5) and changes in inequality between
East and West (row 6) had on overall inequality. In order to interpret these
contributions note that in our sample about one ￿fth of households live in the
East, with that fraction falling somewhat by the end of the sample. Table II
reinforces the ￿nding that the East contributes a disproportionate (relative
to the population) share of the increase in the overall variance, especially for
the earnings and income variables. Furthermore, at least for wages, earnings
and equivalized consumption some of the increase in within-region inequality
is o⁄set by a decline in between-region inequality.68
Table II: Decomposition of Change in Inequality
Variable wm yL yD yD=s c=s
￿￿2 0.036 0.175 0.038 0.020 0.019
nE￿￿2
E 0.014 0.055 0.016 0.012 0.007
nW￿￿2
W 0.047 0.127 0.021 0.011 0.018
￿n -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000
￿￿E;W -0.025 -0.008 0.001 -0.003 -0.006
8 Conclusion
This paper documents the evolution in inequality in Germany in the last
twenty ￿ve years, a period that saw the German reuni￿cation in 1990. We
show that, broadly speaking, inequality was rather stable in the years prior
to the German uni￿cation. It rose, at impact, because a poorer sample from
the East joined the West German data. After the reuni￿cation inequality
in market wages and earnings rose both in the East and in the West, with
a more pronounced increase in the East and some convergence between the
two regions. On the other hand, the public tax and transfer system seems
to have mitigated some of this inequality increase, with inequality in after
68Note that the last row measures both the e⁄ects of changes in relative log-means,
as well as changes in the population shares receiving these relative means. Since the
share of households living in the East (which has lower means) declines, one may observe
￿convergence￿ even without changes in the relative East-West means. For wages, the
only variable for which ￿￿E;W is substantially negative, both e⁄ects are present: there is
some convergence between mean log wages in the East and the West in the 10 years after
the German uni￿cation, and the share of households residing in former West Germany
increased by about two percentage points.
49tax-transfer household disposable income (and consumption) showing sub-
stantially less of an increase. These developments happened against the
backdrop of slower trend growth in post-uni￿cation Germany than prior to
the reuni￿cation. The data tell a tale of two di⁄erent countries, one that
existed in the West prior to reuni￿cation, and post-uni￿cation Germany.69
Future work has to augment our purely descriptive analysis with theory in
order to investigate the determinants of these joint inequality and growth
trends of the two decades.
69The authors were lucky enough to experience the German reuni￿cation (in the West)
during their youth. None of our analysis or discussion is meant to be a critical normative
evaluation of this unique historical event or its economic consequences.
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53A Details of Data Construction: GSOEP
A.1 Sample Setup and Variable De￿nition
A.1.1 Variable De￿nitions
All income and hours variables in GSOEP refer to the previous year.70 Since
we have data from the questionnaires of 1984 to 2005, we therefore have infor-
mation on income and hours from 1983 to 2004, except for disposable house-
hold income.71 When we use other household characteristics in our analysis
(e.g. when calculating equivalized income, or residual income), we use the
characteristics of the current year.72 Most of these characteristics (e.g. gen-
der, residence in East/West, education) should be relatively time-invariant,
while clearly some others, especially household composition, change more
frequently over time. The alternative procedure to use household character-
istics from the previous year would however lead to non-random attrition
and the loss of a signi￿cant number of observations (especially all observa-
tions in the year of ￿rst interview). The ￿rst data on East Germans relate
to 1991, except for participation and hours, for which they relate to 1990.
For all calculations, we use cross-sectional weights. All monetary variables
are in￿ ated to year 2000 Euros using the consumer price index.73
Labor earnings, private transfers, public transfers, and tax pay-
ments All income variables are de￿ned as speci￿ed by the joint guidelines.
The only notable exception comes with self-employment income: Since the
question concerning income from self-employment and free-lance work comes
in a list of questions regarding labor earnings from di⁄erent sources, and since
the Cross-National Equivalence Files (CNEF) count this variable in its en-
tirety as labor earnings, we choose to follow CNEF and add this income in its
entirety to labor earnings. Thus, there is no capital income from businesses
in our de￿nition.
While earnings, private inter-vivo transfers and public transfers are di-
rectly reported in GSOEP, tax payments are not reported and are simulated
70Only participation rates rely on a variable that refers to the current year.
71Asset income information is available for the ￿rst time for 1984.
72Becker et al. (2002) and Grabka and Frick (2008) also use this procedure.
73The consumer price index is di⁄erent for East and West German states until 1999,
and common from 2000 on.
54in the CNEF data. The simulation program is fairly comprehensive, updated
annually to re￿ ect changes in the tax code, and comprises taxes and social
security contributions.74 Yet, it is likely that the simulation overstates actual
tax payments, since it only takes account of standard deductions (Becker et.
al., 2002).
Asset income Asset income is only available in GSOEP from the year 1984
on. The basis of our asset income variables are the CNEF variable for asset
income and the CNEF variable for imputed rental value of owner-occupied
housing.
The CNEF variable on asset income summarizes ￿nancial income (income
from stocks and interests on bonds, saving accounts, etc.), adds to this rental
income, and subtracts operating costs of non-owner occupied housing. We
modify this variable in three ways to comply closer with the guidelines. First,
since the guidelines do not call for the subtraction of operating costs, we add
this component again. Second, from 1997 on, GSOEP provides a measure of
payments made to pay back consumer debt. We assume that 10% of these
payments constitute interest, and subtract these from the CNEF asset income
variable. Third, we impute interest payments on mortgages of non-owner oc-
cupied housing from information on mortgage payments on these properties,
and deduct these interest payments from the asset income variable.75 Given
that we de￿ne all income from self-employment as labor income, no capital
income from businesses is added.
The CNEF variable of the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing
also captures the imputed rent subsidy for households living in rent-reduced
apartments. It subtracts owner-speci￿c costs for taxation, maintenance, op-
erating costs, and interest on mortgages from the gross imputed rental value.
Since the imputed operating costs are not given separately, we do not add
them back here as we do for non-owner occupied housing.
Hours and participation Annual hours are provided in the CNEF based
on the answers of ￿hours in a usual week￿spent in full-time employment and
part-time employment, and the indicated number of months the individual
worked full-time or part-time. Thus, vacation, sick-times, holidays etc. are
not accounted for. This should certainly lead to an upward bias in the mean
74For more details, see Schwarze (1995).
75See Fuchs-Sch￿ndeln and Sch￿ndeln (2005) for a detailed description of this procedure.
55working hours. Moreover, vacation time has gone slightly up and sick time
down in Germany over our sample period. We de￿ne anyone as working who
reports positive hours in a given year.
To analyze the fraction of the population working full-time or part-time,
we use a self-reported categorization as working full-time or part-time.76
Wages Wages are calculated by dividing individual labor earnings through
hours worked. Both earnings and hours are set to zero if they are missing,
but the respective other variable is either missing as well or zero, and the
individual reports not to be working. Given that hours worked are overesti-
mated, wages are underestimated. We set wages to missing if an individual
reports positive hours but zero earnings, or the other way round.
Head and spouse We follow the guidelines regarding the de￿nition of the
head. Speci￿cally, we use the following algorithm:
1. Single households:
(a) If only 1 household member he/she is head.
(b) If only 1 adult household member, this adult member is head.
2. Couple households: identi￿ed by the fact that there is exactly one
￿head￿as de￿ned by SOEP and one ￿partner￿as de￿ned by SOEP:
for these households, the male who is either de￿ned as head or partner
by SOEP is the head. Moreover, the female who is either de￿ned as
head or partner by SOEP is the spouse.
3. Non-couple households: Check whether male aged between 25 and 60
is present:
(a) if yes, oldest of these males is head
(b) If no, oldest female aged between 25 and 60 is head
76Results do not change signi￿cantly if we instead characterize individuals as working
part-time if they work up to 30 hours a week, and as working full-time if they work
more than 30 hours. The ￿fth percentile of the individuals who categorize themselves as
working full-time works 35 hours in a usual week. The 75th percentile of the individuals
who categorize themselves as working part-time works 30 hours in a usual week.
56Household composition and education We construct the OECD equiv-
alence scales as suggested by the guidelines. As controls for household com-
position, we construct 9 dummies for each combination of households with
1, 2, and 3+ adults, and with 0, 1, and 2+ children. In accordance with
the OECD equivalence scales, a child is de￿ned as an individual up to in-
cluding age 16, and an adult is de￿ned as an individual 17 or older. We
de￿ne the highest education level of an individual as either college, voca-
tional training, school degree, or no school degree. Any school degree (i.e.
Hauptschulabschluss, Realschulabschluss, or Abitur) counts as school degree.
As educational controls in regressions of household variables, we construct 20
dummy variables. 4 dummy variables concern the highest degree of the head
if no spouse is present in the household. The other 16 dummy variables are
all possible combinations of the 4 degrees of education for head and spouse.77
A.1.2 Sample selection
The original sample consists of 181,873 household-year observations. By re-
stricting the sample to household-year observations with heads between the
ages of 25 and 60 (including), we are left with 128,398 observations. Exclud-
ing the households in which any working household member reports a wage
below 3 Euro (in year 2000 Euros), we get a sample of 118,792 household-year
observations. Income is not reported for households from the East sample
for the years 1989 and 1990. Deleting these observations gives a sample
of 115,562 household-year observations. We also delete all household-year
observations for which the income variables are missing or reported post-
government income is negative. This leaves us with 103,316 household year
observations for income variables.78 In our analyses, we include all subsam-
ples of GSOEP with the appropriate cross-sectional weights.79 The only
subsample which we exclude is the high income sample, which was added
in 2002. This removes 2,520 household-year observations. Thus, the ￿nal
sample consists of 100,796 household-year observations, of which 71,752 have
77In the ￿nal sample, there are 3,743 household-year observations with missing educa-
tion.
78There are 575 observations for which the household income variables are missing for
the head, but are reported for other members of the household. We decided to exclude
these households as well. The missing income observations come from all subsamples, all
years, and all ages.
79Survey weights are very important, since GSOEP oversamples foreigners, immigrants,
and East Germans.
57a spouse present. Of these household-year observations, 6,274 report zero
household earnings, and 5,091 report zero pre-government income.
When analyzing hours worked, we do not exclude households with missing
income information. Non-working individuals are always excluded in the
analysis of working hours.
A.2 East and West residence before reuni￿cation
In 2003, GSOEP asked respondents whether they lived in East Germany,
West Germany, or abroad in 1989. Thus, we can identify whether an indi-
vidual is originally from the East or originally from the West. 2.75% of our
sample heads lived abroad in 1989,80 and are excluded from the analysis when
we analyze income developments of East and West Germans separately. 2,883
of the sample respondents refuse to answer the question. Of those, we assign
483 to East and 1,890 to West according to their education. GSOEP reports
educational degrees from East and West Germany separately, which allows
this assignment. The remaining 510 are dropped.81 We use this East-West
characterization when creating residual variances, but use the current resi-
dence in the decomposition analysis of Section 7, to make results comparable
to the EVS.
B Details of Data Construction: EVS
B.1 Sample Setup and Variable De￿nition
B.1.1 Variable De￿nitions
All income and consumption variables are calculated in annual terms of the
same year. Both variables are determined by means of a household diary.
The time-frame over which the diary is kept has changed over the years.
Speci￿cally, the diary used to be an annual diary until 1993 and has been
switched to a quarterly one since the 1998 cross-section.82 The conversion
into annual ￿gures is done by simple projections. The switch from annual to
80Most of these are from the immigrant sample.
81There are 6 individuals who report living in East Germany in 1989, but have
been in the sample before 1990. We drop these observations.
82Selected items were recorded over one month in the early surveys (1978-1993).
58quarterly data may nevertheless have distorting e⁄ects on the distributions
of income and consumption as the cross-quarter correlations are unknown.83
The wealth variables are constructed from a set of questions on a variety
of di⁄erent individual assets. Again, the actual questionnaire has changed
over the years as certain asset categories have been regrouped. In all cross-
sections, the wealth questions refer to the wealth position at the beginning
of the same year.84
Finally, all household characteristics are questioned at the beginning of
the year and refer to the same year. We report all monetary variables in
Euros and prices of 2001. To do so, we use separate CPIs for East and West
Germany. All results are weighted using the sample weights provided by the
Federal Statistical O¢ ce.
Labor income, private transfers, public transfers, and tax payments
All income variables are de￿ned as close as possible to the joint guidelines.
Like for the GSOEP, we deviate from the guidelines only for the case of
income from self-employment. We have no information which would allow
us to separate labor and capital income from businesses so that we include
all income from self-employment into labor income.
Labor income is thus de￿ned as the sum of individual payments from de-
pendent and self-employed work, which are mostly questioned separately for
each household member in the EVS. Private transfers comprise private pen-
sions and private non-pension transfers. Among private pensions we include
all kinds of occupational pensions and private annuities. The other - non-
pension - private transfers cover support payments from unions, any kinds of
non-government organizations and other private households. Furthermore,
payments from insurance companies other than pensions are included and
￿nally inheritances.
Public transfers include all kinds of public pensions, health related trans-
fers like sickness bene￿ts, unemployment bene￿ts and other transfers like
83A more comprehensive discussion of these issues is provided in Sommer (2008).
84The timing of the questions has been altered repeatedly though: Between 1978 and
1988, the wealth questions were split into an introductory interview (￿nancial wealth)
and a ￿nal interview (real estate and debt) at the beginning and at the end of the year
respectively. In 1993, the wealth questions were regrouped into the ￿nal interview. In
1998, the wealth questions were added to the quarterly household diary and ￿nally in
2003, they moved into an appendix to the introductory interview. To what extent this
induces di⁄erences in the quality of the data is unclear.
59child bene￿ts and housing bene￿ts.85
Tax payments are ￿in contrast to the GSOEP ￿also questioned in con-
siderable detail in the EVS. They comprise ordinary income taxes and con-
tributions to the social security system, as well as estate, gift, wealth, and
church taxes. Also selected consumption related taxes are included like an-
imal taxes and taxes for hunting rights. Finally, we account for tax refunds
which we treat like negative taxes.
Financial asset income is de￿ned as the sum of interest and dividend pay-
ments from ￿nancial wealth. Adding actual rental income and hypothetical
rent for owner occupied housing net of interest payments for outstanding
mortgages we arrive at total asset income. For part of consumer credits, an
analog procedure is hampered as the data does not distinguish between in-
terest payments and credit repayments. As all business income is included in
income from self-employment, a possible capital income component is equiv-
alently not included in asset income.
Our de￿nition of pre-government income adds income from employment,
private transfers, and asset income from ￿nancial assets. To arrive at post-
government income, we add all kinds of public transfers and deduct taxes
and contributions to the social security system. Note, that the de￿nitions
of pre- and post-government income do not include income from real estate
wealth.
Consumption We employ two di⁄erent de￿nitions of non-durable con-
sumption in our analyses. They di⁄er in the inclusion of housing expenditures
(rented and owner-occupied) and are otherwise identical. As consumption is
captured in much detail in the EVS we can construct an almost ideal measure
of non-durable consumption. Where we have to deviate from the desired clas-
si￿cation of expenditures into durable and non-durable consumption it is due
to changes in the questionnaire. Homogeneous de￿nitions across years seem
more important for our analyses than improving the de￿nitions in individual
years.
We include expenditures for food, clothes, energy, health, body care,
travel, communication, education, rent, and household services in non-durable
consumption. On the other side, we declare expenditures for furniture and
real estate maintenance durable consumption only.
85A complete list of items included in the income and wealth variables can be found in
the appendix of Sommer (2008).
60The remaining categories leisure, vehicles, and miscellaneous are part
durable and part non-durable. Where possible we split the categories ac-
cordingly. In case of doubt or indivisibilities we include the expenditures
into durable consumption as a clean measure of non-durable consumption
seems more important to us. Notable among the remaining expenditures
which we classify as non-durable are car repairs and repairs of all kinds of
electronic devices as well as tickets for all kinds of entertainment. Finally,
we include insurance premia and expenditures for ￿nancial services in non-
durable consumption.
Wealth We de￿ne gross ￿nancial wealth as the sum of assets held with
banks, in building society saving contracts, and in securities. Assets held
with banks mostly include saving accounts, saving certi￿cates, and term de-
posits. The securities include stocks, government and commercial bonds,
as well as mutual funds. Note that also mutual funds on housing assets
are included. Further, we add the surrender value of life insurance wealth.
The EVS cross-sections 1998 and 2003 additionally include privately lent out
money, and for 1993 we have additional information on checking account bal-
ances. We include neither in our de￿nition of ￿nancial wealth for reasons of
comparability. For a comprehensive measure of ￿nancial wealth we are also
lacking cash holdings, which the EVS like most other surveys has never ques-
tioned. Deducting outstanding consumer credits we arrive at our de￿nition
of net ￿nancial wealth.
A comprehensive de￿nition of real wealth would include housing and busi-
ness equity, as well as valuables and durable goods. For reasons of data avail-
ability we restrict our de￿nition of real wealth to housing equity. Especially
the lack of business equity will have e⁄ects on evaluations of wealth inequal-
ity as it likely accounts for a large share of private wealth among business
owners. Unfortunately, the EVS only included questions on business wealth
in the year 1983 and referred to ￿scal values instead of market values. For
part of valuables some data are available on purchases and sales. We also
know about the existence and number of certain durable goods, e.g. cars,
fridges or dishwashers, but no information about their value is included.
As mentioned above, we therefore de￿ne gross real wealth to be the mar-
ket value of all pieces of real estate owned by the household. To arrive at net
real wealth, we deduct the amount of outstanding mortgages.
61The household head We proceed according to the following algorithm:
￿ For all single households, households with only one adult member, as
well as couple households the oldest male becomes the new household
head. Where there is no male in the household, the oldest female is
de￿ned the household head
￿ Only for composite households, we employ a di⁄erent de￿nition and
choose the oldest working male to be the household head. A decision
had to be made on the question who should be considered working:
￿We start out from the individuals￿self-assessed work-status as
provided in the EVS data
￿For individuals who declare themselves as ￿non-working￿or ￿re-
tired￿but nevertheless indicate positive amounts of work income,
we override their self-assessment.86
Family composition and education For the cross-sectional variance de-
composition, we include dummies for nine household types. The ten under-
lying household types are de￿ned based on the number of adults and the
number of children in the household. Speci￿cally, we distinguish:
Type 1: 1 adult, no kids
Type 2: 1 adult, 1 kid
Type 3: 1 adult, 2 or more kids
Type 4: 2 adults, no kids
Type 5: 2 adults, 1 kid
Type 6: 2 adults, 2 kids
Type 7: 2 adults, 3 or more kids
Type 8: 3 or more adults, no kids
Type 9: 3 or more adults, 1 kid
Type 10: 3 or more adults, 2 or more kids
Additionally, we include dummies for di⁄erent educational attainments,
which always refer to the household head. The EVS does not provide in-
formation on the individuals￿years of school or the highest school degrees.
86We apply this correction only for the ￿rst two household members as the early cross-
sections 1978-88 do not report individual level incomes from work for the remaining house-
hold members.
62Instead, since 1993, individuals are asked about their job speci￿c education.
After some harmonization we distinguish the following types of education:
Type 1: no job speci￿c education or training (yet), also students and
interns
Type 2: college degree
Type 3: degree from a College of Applied Science (FH)
Type 4: master craftsman
Type 5: junior craftsman
B.1.2 Sample selection
The six scienti￿c use ￿les of the EVS which span the years 1978 through 2003
in ￿ve-year intervals contain roughly 40-50,000 households each. Of the total
267,434 observations we drop those with a head aged below 25 or above 60.
This leaves us with a sample of 192,429 households. We furthermore drop 46
households with extremely high incomes. This is necessary, as the Federal
Statistical O¢ ce applies a sampling threshold with respect to household in-
come. This threshold, however, has changed over the years so that a di⁄erent
slice of the income distribution is cut o⁄every year. We aim to eliminate the
e⁄ects of the changing sampling threshold by applying the lowest threshold
which was in place in 1988, to all other years.
For the cohort-analysis underlying the life-cycle pro￿les, we additionally
excluded East Germans, which were not sampled until 1993. Again, the
purpose is to ensure the homogeneity of cohorts as good as possible. Given
that we only know the place of residence from the EVS and not the regional
provenance from the years before the German Reuni￿cation, the correction is
obviously a poor one but the best we can do. After excluding these subsam-
ples, we are left with 22-33,000 households per year and a total of 172,628
observations.
Contrary to the GSOEP approach, we do not exclude households with
implausibly low wages as the EVS does not contain direct information on
wages and questions weekly hours only since 2003. Any further exclusions
apply only for technical reasons. Especially calculating the variance of logs,
for instance, we lose all observations with zero or negative values of income.
63